Research
I have research interests in philosophy of physics, general philosophy of science, and metaphysics.
My research activity focuses on two subjects.
I examine naturalness as a guiding principle for theory choice in high energy physics. Since October 2020 I am part of a research group on naturalness within the interdisciplinary research unit “The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider.” I am also interested in structural causal models as a framework for understanding concepts of actual causation. This work is based on the results of my PhD thesis which I defended in August 2020.
My research activity focuses on two subjects.
I examine naturalness as a guiding principle for theory choice in high energy physics. Since October 2020 I am part of a research group on naturalness within the interdisciplinary research unit “The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider.” I am also interested in structural causal models as a framework for understanding concepts of actual causation. This work is based on the results of my PhD thesis which I defended in August 2020.
Peer Reviewed Publications:
[3] forthcoming: Three Concepts of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Published version
[2] forthcoming: Causation and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 88(5). Accepted manuscript, Published version
[1] 2016: The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(1): 79-96. Published version
[2] forthcoming: Causation and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 88(5). Accepted manuscript, Published version
[1] 2016: The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(1): 79-96. Published version
Other Publications:
2016: Conference Report: SOPhiA 2016. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(3):121-124. Published version
Work in Progress:
- Actual Causation and the Challenge of Purpose (under review)
- Actual Causation in the Law (in preparation)
- Actual Causation in the Law (in preparation)
Dissertation:
Title: Actual Causation.
Defended 08/2020
Abstract:
In my doctoral thesis I argue that we need to be pluralist with regard to actual causation and I provide an analysis of the context-sensitivity of concepts of actual causation. Part I of the thesis introduces two central problems for theories of actual causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. It also provides a review of causal model based approaches to provide a unified solution to these two problems. Part II presents my pluralist account. I argue from an interventionist perspective that we need to distinguish three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I also argue that we need a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts: even though the interventionist approach is largely successful there are some instances of causal reasoning that are better explained from the perspective of responsibility. Part III explores consequences of the pluralist account. I employ a distinction between two kinds of context-sensitivity in order to show that attempts to provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. I also present a new argument for incorporating a distinction between context-sensitive default and deviant values into causal models.
Defended 08/2020
Abstract:
In my doctoral thesis I argue that we need to be pluralist with regard to actual causation and I provide an analysis of the context-sensitivity of concepts of actual causation. Part I of the thesis introduces two central problems for theories of actual causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. It also provides a review of causal model based approaches to provide a unified solution to these two problems. Part II presents my pluralist account. I argue from an interventionist perspective that we need to distinguish three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I also argue that we need a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts: even though the interventionist approach is largely successful there are some instances of causal reasoning that are better explained from the perspective of responsibility. Part III explores consequences of the pluralist account. I employ a distinction between two kinds of context-sensitivity in order to show that attempts to provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. I also present a new argument for incorporating a distinction between context-sensitive default and deviant values into causal models.
Selected Talks:
Causation and the Problem of Disagreement
11/2021 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2020, Baltimore; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
Pluralism about Actual Causation
09/2021 XXV. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Erlangen-Nürnberg; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
11/2019 Cambridge Philosophy of Science (CamPoS), Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge.
Causation, Intervention, and Responsibility
09/2019 Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), Geneva.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
08/2018 Workshop on Causes, Norms and Decisions, Hanover.
Epistemic Iteration and Scientific Progress
07/2017 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Edinburgh.
Religion and the Problem of Knowledge Certification
06/2017 Workshop with Philip Kitcher, Leibniz University Hanover.
Tacit Knowledge in Science
11/2016 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2016, Atlanta.
07/2016 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Cardiff.
Assessing the Past Hypothesis
07/2016 18th UK and European Conference on Foundations of Physics, LSE London.
The Concept of Causation in Physics
03/2016 Conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf.
11/2021 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2020, Baltimore; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
Pluralism about Actual Causation
09/2021 XXV. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Erlangen-Nürnberg; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
11/2019 Cambridge Philosophy of Science (CamPoS), Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge.
Causation, Intervention, and Responsibility
09/2019 Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), Geneva.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
08/2018 Workshop on Causes, Norms and Decisions, Hanover.
Epistemic Iteration and Scientific Progress
07/2017 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Edinburgh.
Religion and the Problem of Knowledge Certification
06/2017 Workshop with Philip Kitcher, Leibniz University Hanover.
Tacit Knowledge in Science
11/2016 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2016, Atlanta.
07/2016 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Cardiff.
Assessing the Past Hypothesis
07/2016 18th UK and European Conference on Foundations of Physics, LSE London.
The Concept of Causation in Physics
03/2016 Conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf.
