Research
I have research interests in philosophy of physics, general philosophy of science, and metaphysics.
My research activity focuses on two subjects. I am interested in the roles that principles play in advancing scientific inquiry. For example, I examine naturalness as a guiding principle for theory choice in high energy physics. I am also interested in structural causal models as a framework for understanding concepts of actual causation.
My research activity focuses on two subjects. I am interested in the roles that principles play in advancing scientific inquiry. For example, I examine naturalness as a guiding principle for theory choice in high energy physics. I am also interested in structural causal models as a framework for understanding concepts of actual causation.
Peer Reviewed Publications:
[4] forthcoming: Naturalness and the Forward-Looking Justification of Scientific Principles. Philosophy of Science. Accepted manuscript
It has been suggested that particle physics has reached the "dawn of the post-naturalness era." I provide an explanation of the current shift in particle physicists' attitude towards naturalness. I argue that the naturalness principle was perceived to be supported by the theories it has inspired. The potential coherence between major beyond the Standard Model (BSM) proposals and the naturalness principle led to an increasing degree of credibility of the principle among particle physicists. The absence of new physics at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) has undermined the potential coherence and has led to the principle's loss of significance.
[3] forthcoming: Three Concepts of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Accepted manuscript, Published version
I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation.
[2] 2021: Causation and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 88(5): 773-783. Accepted manuscript, Published version
This article presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes, and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults.
[1] 2016: The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(1): 79-96. Published version (open access).
It has been suggested that particle physics has reached the "dawn of the post-naturalness era." I provide an explanation of the current shift in particle physicists' attitude towards naturalness. I argue that the naturalness principle was perceived to be supported by the theories it has inspired. The potential coherence between major beyond the Standard Model (BSM) proposals and the naturalness principle led to an increasing degree of credibility of the principle among particle physicists. The absence of new physics at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) has undermined the potential coherence and has led to the principle's loss of significance.
[3] forthcoming: Three Concepts of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Accepted manuscript, Published version
I argue that we need to distinguish between three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I provide two lines of argument in support of this account. First, I address three thought experiments that have been troublesome for unified accounts of actual causation, and I show that my account provides a better explanation of corresponding causal intuitions. Second, I provide a functional argument: if we assume that a key purpose of causal concepts is to guide agency, we are better off making a distinction between three concepts of actual causation.
[2] 2021: Causation and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophy of Science, 88(5): 773-783. Accepted manuscript, Published version
This article presents a new argument for incorporating a distinction between default and deviant values into the formalism of causal models. The argument is based on considerations about how causal reasoners should represent disagreement over causes, and it is defended against an objection that has been raised against earlier arguments for defaults.
[1] 2016: The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(1): 79-96. Published version (open access).
Other Publications:
2016: Conference Report: SOPhiA 2016. Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy, 30(3):121-124. Published version (open access)
Work in Progress:
- On the Life-Cycle of Principles (with R. Dardashti and R. Harlander)
- On Actual Causation and the Challenge of Purpose
- On Actual Causation in the Law
- On Causes of Death and 'Excited Delirium Syndrome' (with S. Jukola)
- On Causal Pluralism and Counting COVID Deaths (with L. White)
- On Actual Causation and the Challenge of Purpose
- On Actual Causation in the Law
- On Causes of Death and 'Excited Delirium Syndrome' (with S. Jukola)
- On Causal Pluralism and Counting COVID Deaths (with L. White)
Dissertation:
Title: Actual Causation.
Defended 08/2020
Abstract:
In my doctoral thesis I argue that we need to be pluralist with regard to actual causation and I provide an analysis of the context-sensitivity of concepts of actual causation. Part I of the thesis introduces two central problems for theories of actual causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. It also provides a review of causal model based approaches to provide a unified solution to these two problems. Part II presents my pluralist account. I argue from an interventionist perspective that we need to distinguish three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I also argue that we need a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts: even though the interventionist approach is largely successful there are some instances of causal reasoning that are better explained from the perspective of responsibility. Part III explores consequences of the pluralist account. I employ a distinction between two kinds of context-sensitivity in order to show that attempts to provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. I also present a new argument for incorporating a distinction between context-sensitive default and deviant values into causal models.
Defended 08/2020
Abstract:
In my doctoral thesis I argue that we need to be pluralist with regard to actual causation and I provide an analysis of the context-sensitivity of concepts of actual causation. Part I of the thesis introduces two central problems for theories of actual causation: the problem of redundancy and the problem of selection. It also provides a review of causal model based approaches to provide a unified solution to these two problems. Part II presents my pluralist account. I argue from an interventionist perspective that we need to distinguish three concepts of actual causation: total, path-changing, and contributing actual causation. I also argue that we need a pluralist account with regard to the function of these concepts: even though the interventionist approach is largely successful there are some instances of causal reasoning that are better explained from the perspective of responsibility. Part III explores consequences of the pluralist account. I employ a distinction between two kinds of context-sensitivity in order to show that attempts to provide a principled approach to actual causation in the law face difficulties. I also present a new argument for incorporating a distinction between context-sensitive default and deviant values into causal models.
Selected Talks (Past and Upcoming):
Naturalness and the Forward-Looking Justification of Scientific Principles
11/2022 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting, Pittsburgh.
07/2022 Society for Philosophy of Science in Practice (SPSP) Seventh Biennial Conference, Ghent.
04/2022 Conference of the Irvine-London-Munich-Polimi-Salzburg Network in Philosophy and Foundations of Physics (ILMPS), Milan.
Bodies of Evidence - Causation in Forensic Medicine, with Saana Jukola
06/2022 Colloquium, Chair for Philosophy and History of Science, Ruhr University Bochum.
Panelist on "Beyond the Merely Empirical"
06/2022 History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Cosmology and Astro-Particle Physics, Bonn
Naturalness as a Constitutive Principle?
08/2022 Conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP), Berlin.
Causal Models and Actual Causation in the Law
09/2021 Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), Turin.
Causation and the Problem of Disagreement
11/2021 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2020, Baltimore; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
Pluralism about Actual Causation
09/2021 XXV. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Erlangen-Nürnberg; postponed due to COVID-19 pandemic.
11/2019 Cambridge Philosophy of Science (CamPoS), Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge.
Causation, Intervention, and Responsibility
09/2019 Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA), Geneva.
09/2018 Conference of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP), Cologne.
08/2018 Workshop on Causes, Norms and Decisions, Hanover.
Epistemic Iteration and Scientific Progress
07/2017 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Edinburgh.
Religion and the Problem of Knowledge Certification
06/2017 Workshop with Philip Kitcher, Leibniz University Hanover.
Tacit Knowledge in Science
11/2016 Philosophy of Science Association (PSA) Biennial Meeting 2016, Atlanta.
07/2016 Annual Conference of the British Society for the Philosophy of Science (BSPS), Cardiff.
Assessing the Past Hypothesis
07/2016 18th UK and European Conference on Foundations of Physics, LSE London.
The Concept of Causation in Physics
03/2016 Conference of the German Society for the Philosophy of Science (GWP), Düsseldorf.
